British influence in Brussels had been far greater than recognised by Faull, Jonathan et al.
British	influence	in	Brussels	had	been	far	greater	than
recognised
Britain	had	far	greater	influence	in	Brussels	since	1973	than	has
been	recognised.	For	decades	the	UK	was	a	driving	and	liberalising
force	when	it	came	to	the	Single	Market,	enlargement,	competition
and	trade,	as	well	as	foreign	policy.	Jonathan	Faull	(Kings	College
London),	Piers	Ludlow	(LSE),	and	Laurent	Warlouzet
(Université	du	Littoral	Côte	d’Opale)	outline	the	story	of	this
significant	and	widespread	British	sway	over	the	EU.
Britain	had	more	influence	during	its	four	decades	as	a	member	state	of	the	European	Community/Union	than	has
normally	been	recognised.	As	such	the	UK	was	able	to	do	much	to	shape	the	policies,	institutions	and	character	of
the	Union.	And	the	loss	of	this	influence	once	the	country	ceases	to	be	a	member	of	the	EU	will	be	highly	significant,
both	for	the	British	themselves	and	for	the	EU	that	they	depart	from.		Such	were	the	conclusions	of	the	‘British
Influence	in	Brussels:	Looking	Back	and	Looking	Forwards’	event	at	the	LSE	on	June	18	2018.[1]
The	most	obvious	indication	of	British	influence	in	Brussels	was	the	way	in	which	the	UK	succeeded	in	shaping	a
number	of	core	EC/EU	policies.	Prominent	amongst	these	was	the	Internal	Market,	the	central	policy	of	the	European
Community’s	mid-1980s	revival.	This	was	an	initiative	energetically	championed	by	Margaret	Thatcher’s	government
and	one	the	implementation	of	which	was	masterminded	by	a	British	Commissioner,	Arthur	Cockfield.	It	was	also	a
policy	about	which	both	Germany	and	France	were	much	more	ambivalent.	British	support	and	backing	for	it	were
thus	essential	to	its	realisation.	And	given	the	Single	Market	programme’s	centrality	to	the	direction	of	the
Community/Union’s	development	over	the	subsequent	period,	the	UK	can	thus	legitimately	claim	to	have	had	a
decisive	impact	upon	the	whole	trajectory	of	European	integration	in	the	final	decades	of	the	20th	century.
This	was	not	an	isolated	example.	Another	key	instance	of	British	influence	has	been	enlargement:	the	UK	was	a
consistent	advocate	of	a	rapid	opening	of	the	EC/EU	to	new	member	states,	especially	those	of	Central	and	Eastern
Europe.	Competition	policy	would	be	a	further	example:	Britain’s	departure	indeed	may	well	call	into	question	the
underlying	philosophy	by	which	the	case	for	and	against	corporate	mergers	has	been	judged,	with	market
considerations	losing	ground	to	the	desire	to	establish	of	‘European	champions’,	i.e.	companies	big	enough	to
compete	globally.	In	trade	policy	also,	the	UK	has	been	a	liberalising	voice	of	some	weight.	Looking	further	back,	the
British	were	important	shapers	of	the	Community’s	regional	policy	when	it	was	first	introduced	during	the	1970s.	And
even	in	an	area	like	foreign	policy	coordination,	there	were	periods,	like	the	early	1980s,	when	the	UK	participated
enthusiastically	in	EC	level	discussions	and	helped	steer	policy.	The	Venice	Declaration	of	1980,	which	took	a	major
step	towards	recognising	the	need	to	involve	Palestinian	representatives	in	any	Arab-Israeli	peace	settlement,	would
be	a	case	in	point.
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In	similar	fashion,	the	UK	has	over	the	course	of	its	four	decades	within	the	European	system	exercised	an	important
influence	over	the	operation	of	the	European	institutions.	This	has	not	been	solely,	or	even	mainly,	a	matter	of
language.	The	gradual	displacement	of	French	by	English	as	the	lingua	franca	of	the	EU	system	has	had	multiple
causes,	with	British	EC/EU	membership	being	just	one	factor	amongst	many.	But	while	the	influx	of	British	civil
servants	certainly	helped	tilt	the	linguistic	balance	away	from	French	and	towards	English,	even	more	important	has
been	the	fashion	in	which	UK-trained	officials	have	altered	the	way	in	which	Eurocrats	have	interacted,	the	way
meetings	have	been	prepared,	and	the	way	in	which	records	have	been	kept.		Anyone	contrasting	the	official	records
of	Commission	meetings	dating	back	to	the	lengthy	tenure	of	Emile	Noël	as	Commission	Secretary	General	(1958-
1987)	and	those	overseen	by	his	successor,	the	Whitehall-trained	David	Williamson,	would	immediately	be	struck	by
the	massive	increase	in	clarity	and	openness	about	disagreement.	Likewise,	the	briefing	notes	with	which	European
Commissioners	were	equipped	when	attending	important	international	meetings	were	utterly	transformed	by	a	new
set	of	practices	introduced	by	Roy	Jenkins’	cabinet	in	the	late	1970s	and	generalised	by	Christopher	Audland,	the
British	deputy	secretary	general.	And	altered	paperwork	was	emblematic	of	a	much	wider	impact	on	the	way	in	which
the	Commission	functioned.
This	institutional	impact	stretched	beyond	the	European	Commission.	In	Strasbourg,	British	MEPs	drew	upon	their
extensive	knowledge	of	House	of	Commons	procedure	to	bring	new	ideas,	new	techniques,	and	new	strategies	to	an
institution	which	was	in	semi-permanent	(and	largely	successful)	quest	for	greater	power	and	authority.	In	the
Council	of	Ministers,	a	succession	of	British	ministers	gained	reputations	as	shrewd	and	effective	operators,
benefitting	also	from	the	backing	of	a	civil	service	machine	whose	coordination	on	European	affairs	was	rivalled	only
by	the	French.	UKREP	–	the	British	permanent	representation	in	Brussels	–	was	also	highly	regarded	and	feared.
And	British	judges	contributed	much	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	Few	of	the	European	structures,	in	other
words,	were	unaffected	by	Britain’s	forty	plus	years	of	membership;	each	in	their	turn	will	be	altered	by	the	UK’s
departure.
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Britain	also	did	much	better	at	playing	the	game	of	European	politics	than	often	realised.	Needless	to	say,	it	did	not
win	all	the	battles	in	which	it	fought,	nor	achieve	all	of	the	goals	that	it	set	itself.	No	state	does.	But	it	often	proved
effective	in	forging	alliances	with	like-minded	governments,	often	including	the	Scandinavians,	and	more	recently	the
states	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Any	attempt	to	read	the	history	of	European	integration	since	1973	as	one	in
which	all	forward	progress	has	been	attributable	to	the	Franco-German	motor,	with	the	British	relegated	merely	to
that	of	the	ineffective	brake,	would	distort	much	more	than	it	enlightened.	And	on	those	occasions	where	the	UK
really	was	uncomfortable	with	the	direction	of	travel	taken	by	its	partners,	it	proved	highly	successful	in	negotiating
effective	opt-outs.	These	can	arguably	traced	back	to	its	1978-9	decision	to	refrain	from	participating	fully	in	the
European	Monetary	System	and	proliferated	during	the	1990s	and	the	first	years	of	the	21st	century,	eventually
covering	Euro	membership,	participation	in	Schengen,	and	important	aspects	of	justice	and	home	affairs	provisions.
Securing	a	comparable	position	of	partial	involvement,	exempt	from	some	European	provisions,	but	still	present	at
the	meetings	that	matter,	is	likely	to	prove	all	but	impossible	once	Britain	has	left	the	EU.	Opting	out	will	prove	more
effective	than	seeking	partially	to	opt	back	in.
This	story	of	significant	and	widespread	British	influence	does,	however,	beg	two	further	questions.	The	first,	looking
back,	is	why	the	UK	chose	collectively	to	disregard	this	capacity	to	shape	the	EC/EU	system,	preferring	instead	to
see	itself	as	the	permanent	malcontent,	the	perpetual	loser	in	the	European	system?	How,	to	put	it	differently,	did	the
‘awkward	partner’	narrative,	emphasising	as	it	does	the	succession	of	spats	between	the	UK	and	its	partners,	entirely
eclipse	the	parallel	but	equally	important	tale	of	UK	success	within	Europe?	And	what	does	this	say	about	the	British
national	debate	and	its	self-perception	as	an	international	actor?	Looking	forward,	meanwhile,	the	post-Brexit	UK	will
have	to	think	long	and	hard	about	how	it	seeks	to	replicate	such	influence	in	the	much	tougher	environment	of	global
trade	negotiations,	world	level	discussions	of	environmental	or	security	issues	or	bilateral	dealings	with	Putin’s
Russia	or	Trump’s	America.	It	will	not	be	an	easy	task.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	not	the	LSE.	
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[1]	Laurent	Warlouzet	was	building	on	ideas	set	out	in	Governing	Europe	in	a	Globalizing	World:	Neoliberalism	and	its	alternatives
following	the	1973	Oil	Crisis,	Routledge,	2018	and	‘Britain	at	the	Centre	of	European	Co-operation	(1948–2016)’,	in	Journal	of
Common	Market	Studies,	56,	1,	2018,	pp.	1-16)
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